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IMPLEMENTING THE POR'IFOLIO (SBU) CONCEPT
During the past decade the concept of corporate strategy has enjoyed
widespread and increasing popularity.

One result of this popularity has been

the development of sophisticated strategic plannillg systems within large, diversified firms.

The portfolio or SBU concept has been unmatched in populari-

ty as a basis for these planning systems.

A recent article in Fortune maga-

zine about corporate strategy even refers to the portfolio concept as having
"magical appeal" for corporate managers.!

Independent of the specific rea-

sons, the portfolio concept is strongly established as the primary basis for
strategic planning systems in many large, diversified firms.

Yet, despite

this popularity, there has been suprisingly little research on the implementation process and its implications for effective strategic management.

Fur-

thermore, in numerous conversations with executives the authors have found the
implementation problems of "making it work" are, in fact, a pressing concern.
This article summarizes the authors' research in this area and provides some
guidelines based on that research that run counter to the conventional

wisdo~

about implementation .
The Portfolio Concept
Although there are numerous slight variations of the portfolio concept,
they all rely on a matrix or grid similar to the one shown in Exhibit 1.

The

matrix classifies businesses by product/market attractiveness along one axis
and competitive position along the other axis.
to measurement along these scales.

There are two basic approaches

One approach relies on a single measure-

able criterion along each axis while the other approach uses multiple measures
(including subjective ones) along each axis (see Exhibit 2).

Typically the
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matrices or grids are divided into either four or nine "boxes" although the
authors have observed some with significantly more.

Exhibit 2 illustrates two

of the most commonly encountered matrices.
Regardless of the particular layout chosen for the matrix, the basic idea
behind the portfolio concept remains the same:

the position (or box) that a

business occupies on the matrix should determine the "grand thrust" or "mission" around which the strategy for the business is developed.

Although these

missions vary somewhat depending on the particular matrix, the top half of Exhibit 2 provides a typical illustration.

(The discussion of implementation

below is independent of the particular matrix used • )

Here the mission of the

"cash cows" is to generate cash flow that can be re-deployed to proiUising
"question marks."

The mission of the "question marks" is to aggressively gain

competitive position with the needed investment funds coming from the cash
cows.

(Obviously the number of question marks in the corporate portfolio must

be balanced with the cash generation capabilities of the cash cows.)

The mis-

sion of the stars is to ensure their own long-term competitive position.

F i-

nally, the mission of the dogs is to generate positive cash flow until they
can be opportunistically divested.

Although this introduction to the portfo-

lio concept has been brief, it will be adequate for the authors' later developments.

The key point is that different boxes on the matrix denoted differ-

ent grand thrusts or missions for the business.

The reader who is unfamilar

with the portfolio concept or who desires a deeper understanding can refer to
several references.2
What Conventional Wisdom Says About Implementation
Around the portfolio concept there has developed an informal conventional
wisdom for using it as a basis for a strategic planning system.

The authors
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have found it in popular articles, in the executive offices of companies
thinking about adopting the portfolio concept., and in the classrooms of several business schools and management development programs.
conventional wisdom is at once simple and compelling.

The logic of the

When analyzed and dis-

tilled the conventional wisdom holds that there are three major steps in implementing the portfolio concept as the basis of a planning system:
(1)

The firm is divided into strategic business units or SBU's.
This involves determining the different businesses the fin~
is in by specifying the economically distinct product/
market segments and the firm's resources that are dedicated
to each segment. The objective is to divide the firm into
the most relevant strategic entities.

(2)

Each of these SBU's is evaluated against the dimensions of
the matrix. On the basis of this analysis the appropriate
grand thrust or mission is assigned to each SBU.

(3)

A strategy is developed within each SBU and reviewed by
corporate management to ensure congruence with the assigned
mission.

This view of implementation is a straight-forward extension of the basic
logic of the portfolio concept.

Unfortunately the authors have found that

this approach does not work in most large, diversified firms.

In a study of

ten firms with varying levels of experience with the portfolio concept one of
the aufhors found that none had been successful using the conventional wisdom.3

Instead a significantly different approach evolved within these firms.

Further research by both authors confirmed this result.

Several reasons

underlie the failure of the conventional wisdom, and to them we now turn.

Why the C.onventional Wisdom Is Often Inappropriate
The conventional wisdom is inappropriate for most large, diversified
firms because it implicitly assumes that a firm can be unambiguously divided
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into a "reasonable number" of independent (in terms of markets and pro.duction
processes) "single businesses."

If a finn can be unambiguously divided into

independent, single businesses, then these businesses can be defined as SBU's
and each assigned amission independent of the others.

Furthermore, the term

"reasonable number" means that the number of businesses (constituted as SBU's)
is small enough that corporate level management can develop the matrix positions, assign the missions, and review SBU strategies and performance to ensure congruence with the assigned missions.
has shown that for large, diversified firms:

However, the authors' research
(1) SBU's cannot be unambiguous-

ly constituted as single businesses; (2) the extent of diversification precludes the "reasonable number" criterion discussed above, and (3) the relatedness of diversification can preclude the independence of the SBU's.
The Ambiguous

~otion o~_~ingle

Business

The concept of what constitutes a single business is difficult to operationalize.

The nature of the problem stems from the fact that a product/

market segment can be defined in a variety of ways.
ally a whole hierarchy of product/market segments.

In fact, there is generAs a hypothetical example.

consider a firm that among other things manufactures and markets appliances.
A logical breakdown might be into specific products (e.g., washers, ranges,
microwave ovens., etc.).

Alternative breakdowns·(from among many possibili-

ties) could be into commercial and home appliances, into different price/
quality segments, or into different geographic segments.

These breakdowns

could be combined to yield increasingly finer segments (e.g., the commercial,
microwave oven business, or the European, high quality home dishwasher business).

So, in sum, SBU's could be defined in a myriad of different ways rang-

ing from the entire appliance business to much smaller segments such
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as the European, high quality, home dishwasher business.

Regardless of which

segments are eventually chosen to define these businesses, arguments could be
·advanced for other segments.

Since segments finer than those finally selected

will generally exist, arguments could be advanced that the definition aggregates several single businesses.

Furthermore, it is easy to see that the po-

sition of the business on the matrix may depend on the definition chosen for
the SBU.

For example, if the entire appliance business is defined as an SBU,

then a "cash cow" mission may be appropriate.

However; in a finer breakdown

by product the microwave oven business could quite conceivably be defined as
an SBU with a "question mark" mission.

The hierarchical nature of product/

market segments frustrates the unambiguous definition of single businesses as
SBU' s.
The Extent of Diversification
Closely related to the problems caused by the ambiguous nature of a single business are the problems inherent in the extent of diversification present in large diversified firms.

The basic nature of the problem is that the

number of product/market segments in which these firms participate is so large
that it completely swamps the "reasonable number" criterion described above.
As an example consider the Eaton Corporation, a firm which had sales of
$2.11 billion in 1977 and is

certainly~

considered to be a conglomerate. In

the Eaton 1977 Annual Report reference is made to over 400 product/market segments that are said to consist of "a single product or family of rel.ated products which go into a well defined and unified market."

Examples given in-

clude economy truck transmission, narrow aisle lift trucks, agricultural
scales, and gas control values.

Is it reasonable to expect that for each of

these over 400 product/market segments meaningful strategy and performance reviews can be conducted by corporate management?

Furthermore, what size staff
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would be needed merely to develop the information necessary for positioning
these segments on the matrix.

The scope of such efforts at the corporate

level would certainly need to be heroic if not foolish.

The application of

these results to most large, diversified corporation s will obviously yield
similar results.The Relatedness of Diversifica tion
Intimately interwoven with the ambiguous nature of a single business is
the related manner in which most large firms are diversified .

It is a known

fact that most firms tend to diversify into areas related to their "core" business.4

The notable exceptions are, of course, the conglomerat es.

This re-

latedness of diversifica tion exacerbates the already ambiguous nature of a
single business and simultaneou sly prevents the achievement of independent
SBU's.

The residual dependency among SBU's frustrates the assignment of mis-

sions independen tly to each SBU because the SBU's themselves are no longer
strategical ly independent entities.
As an example of these ideas consider the previous example of appliances,
only this time assume a firm initially only manufacture s and markets home
washers and dryers.

Diversifica tion could logically take this firm into the

manufacture and sale of home microwave ovens and trash compactors.

This move

itself will exacerbate the problems associated with business definition as
previously discussed.

Furthermore , assume that the washers and dryers are de-

fined as a "home laundry" SBU and that the microwave ovens and trash_ compactors defined as a "home kitchen" SBU.

These two SBU's are obviously not stra-

tegically independent since, among other things they may share distributio n
channels, be often bought in combination (i.e. by housing contractors ), share
a common assembly facility, and mutually benefit from brand name advertising
efforts.

Inevitably there must be some coordinatio n of strategy among the two
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and this will be extremely difficult if different strategic missions are assigned (e.g. cash cow for the laundry SllU and question mark for the kitchen
SBU).

Grouping them all together into an appliance SBU will probably result

in the assignment of an inappropriate mission to some parts (i.e. overall cash
cow mission would probably be inappropriate for the trash compactors).

The

alternative of breaking them down farther (e.g. washers, dryers, microwave
ovens, and trash compactors) will only increase the interdependency between
them.

As this example illustrates the related nature of much diversification

prevents the achievement of independent SBU's and hence reduces the usefulness
of the conventional wisdom for implementing the portfolio concept.

In view of

this and the arguments of the previous two sections the conventional wisdom
would seem to be of limited usefulness.

We now turn to a more useful approach

which the authors have found helps overcome these objections.

The alternative approach is much less dogmatic than the conventional wisdom.

It relies more on a flexible, situational matching of implementation to

the circumstances of the particular firm.
proach

~nvolves

Specifically, the alternative ap-

the hierarchical application of the portfolio concept at mul-

tiple organizational levels, the coordination of inputs among these levels,
and the purposeful but limited variation of managerial systems and processes
across different strategic missions.
Hierarchi~~l Ap_E_~ication

Under the conventional wisdom, the management of a firm confronts a dilemma in the definition of SBU's.

If each distinct product/market segment is

used as the basis of an SBU, then the number of SBU's is likely to be unmanageably large from the corporate level.

On the other hand, if only a

----------------------------------
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manageable number of SBU's are defined, then the mission assigned to any particular SBU is likely to be inappropriate for substantial segments of the SBU
(since the SBU is actually an aggregation of businesses).

Furthern1ore, a

strategic plan based on a single mission for such an aggregated SBU will likely ignore substantial differences among the component businesses.
To overcome this dilemma it is necessary to recognize that the application of the portfolio concept must be hierarchical in order to mirror the hierarchical nature of product/market segments.

In this manner descending lev-

els of the hierarchy can be used to refine the analysis and to achieve a better matching of strategic entity to product/market segment.
Although the authors believe that several levels of anlysis may be ultimately necessary in some firms; they have observed that two overcome most of
the problems associated with the conventional wisdom•

Hence the subsequent

discussion will concentrate on a two level hierarchy.

The extension of these

ideas to hierarchies with more levels should be obvious.
To illustrate the nature of these ideas again consider the appliance example.

Among other things, a firm produces and markets home appliances.

From

the corporate level an SBU called "home appliances" is created and assigned a
cash cow strategic mission.

At the same time, although a home appliance SBU

is created, both corporate management and SBU management recognized that this
represents a coarse or "aggregated" level of analysis that must be subsequently refined.

In turn, the management of the SBU refines the analysis by "dis-

aggregating" it into segments such as home laundry (washers and dryers),
microwave ovens, diswashers, and trash compactors.

Exhibit 3 details the na-

ture of the differences between the two levels of analysis.

While the corpo-

rate level depicts a monolithic cash cow mission, the SBU-level shows several
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strategic entities with both cash cow and question mark missions.

Examination

of this example shows that there are three essential steps.
(1) Group related businesses together to form aggregated SliU's.
The essential logic of this step is that (as discussed earlier) each SBU
must make sense as a single, though aggregated, product/market segment.

How

else can product/market attractiveness and competitive position be evaluated
and how else can a meaningful (aggregated) strategic mission be assigned?

The

necessity of such a step arises because (as previously discussed) a division
of a firm into all of its product/market segments results in a number that is
unmanageable from the corporate level (i.e., the need to aggregate arises).
The obvious question is how much to aggregate.
but there are some general guidelines.
the corporate level.

No simple answer is possible,

The number should be manageable from

This will obviously depend on the management style of

the CEO and on the amount and quality of staff support available.

However,

the authors have not observed any stable planning system with more than 45
SBU's, and hence this number may be taken as an approximate, practical upper
limit.

(The authors have observed firms starting implementation with over 100

SBU's, but this number rapidly decays as the management overload at the corporate level is felt.)

Second, the more related· the businesses of the firm

the fewer SBU's that are required.
fewer different businesses it is in.

In essence the more related a firm is, the
One of the authors studied the related-

ness of six large firms using the portfolio concept as a basis for strategic
planning.

The results are illustrated in Exhibit 4 and show that the nUiuber

of SBU's ranged from 6 for the smallest and most related to 43 for the largest
and least related.S

So, in sum, the practical range would seem to be approxi-

mately from 2 to 50 (aggregated) SBU's.
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One interesting implication of this aggregation process would seem to be
that use of the portfolio concept as a basis for a corporate-wide planning
system by large conglomerates is limited.
ticipates in unrelated businesses.
gregated.

By definition a conglomerate par-

Therefore, they cannot meaningfully be ag-

(What is meant by product/market attractiveness and competitive

position of an SBU composed of an insurance business and a rental car business?)

Hence, if the conglomerate participates in more than about 50 differ-

ent businesses, the portfolio concept is not a practical approach.

(Interest-

ingly, the authors are not aware of any large conglomerate which has adopted
the portfolio concept as the basis of a corporate-wide strategic planning system.)

Exhibit 5 illustrates the nature of the aggregation problem in terms of

the extent and relatedness of diversification as it applies to conglomerates
and other types of firms.
Once the definition of aggregated SBU's is complete, they may be evaluated against the dimensions of the matrix.
(2) Develop the aggregated strategic mission.
The second step is straight-forward and similar to the conventional wisdom except that the aggreated nature of the SBU is recognized.

For the home

appliance example a cash cow mission as shown in Exhibit 5 could conceivably
be appropriate.

The next step is to proceed down the hierarchy to the next

level of analysis.
(3) Define the component businesses of the SBU and develop appropriate
strategic missions for them.
This step represents the disaggregation of the previous corporate level
analysis and takes place at the SBU level.

The logic is that a refinement of

the corporate level analysis is made to incorporate the finer product/market
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struct ure of the firm at an organ izatio nal level where the
tise is availa ble.

appropriat~

exper-

Exhib it 3 illust rates this for the home applia nce exaiDp le.

predom inates ,
Althou gh at the disagg regate d level a cash cow missio n still
other missio ns for other segme nts of the SBU are appare nt.
2 to lJ segThe experi ence of the author s has been that gener ally from
ments of each SBU are identi fied and evalua ted in this step.

Given the earli-

SBU's one can now
er discus sion about the practi cal limits on the number of
being identi fied
envisi on a total of severa l hundre d produ ct/mar ket segme nts
and evalua ted.

reaEven for extrem ely large firms such numbe rs can provid e a

sonabl y clear pictur e of the produ ct/mar ket struct ure.

At this point the ar-

inate the two analgumen t has been develo ped to where the neces sity to coord
yses. should be obviou s.
Coord inatin g the Inputs
is then inevIf there is no coord inatio n betwee n the two levels of analys
and SBU IDanitably substa ntial disagr eemen ts can develo p among corpo rate
ular
Each will hold a single partia lly exclus ive view of any partic

agers.
SBU.

level as purFor examp le, a partic ular SBU may be seen at the corpo rate

suing a "pure" cash cow missio n.

If the plans and capita l budget of this SBU

be) then the corare devise d using a disagg regate d analys is (as they should
cow missio n and
porate review will likely focus on the gap betwee n the cash
the actua l conten t of the plans.

In our home applia nce examp le (see Exhib it

l cash throw- off
3) the corpo rate expec tation may be for a $50 millio n annua
from the SBU.

-off
Howev er, the SBU plans may reflec t only a $25 millio n throw

ave oven and trash
with the remain ing $25 millio n being invest ed in the microw
compa ctor busine sses.

Natur ally a proces s of negot iation always occurs around

differ ent view of
plans, but this negot iation cannot resolv e a fundam entally
an SBU.
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To overcome such difficulties the authors believe that it is necessary to
consciously build in mechanisms for coordinating the two levels of analysis.
Although no single definitive set of mechanisms is currently known to exist,
some which are known to be useful can be discussed.
Perhaps the most obvious and yet the most important mechanism is explicit
recognition at both levels of analysis of the perspective of the other.

In

essence this facilitates the planning process by legitimizing the different
perspectives of both participants as complementary instead of mutually exclusive.

This can be accomplished through planning conferences, management de-

velopment programs (which stress the hierarchical nature of the portfolio concept), and the actual design of the planning systems.

The planning manual, if

one is used, should recognize both levels of analysis and their necessity.
The strategic planning system should be designed around the two levels of
analysis.

The system should be structured so that the basic planning entities

are the individual segments of each particular SBU.

The SBU plans reviewed at

corporate level should be aggregations of these plans stressing overall SBU
strategy with short summaries of the individual segments and their missions
included (perhaps in an appendix).

Furthermore,

th~

basic financial objec-

tives of an SBU can be stated within the plans in a summary form (perhaps in
an appendix) which shows how they are arrived at·by aggregation.
Each year the detailed plans of a limited number of segments of SHU's can
be carefully scrutinized at the coporate level.

These segments can be chosen

randomly or for their strategic relevance to the firm as a whole.

Such an

audit in addition to its direct benefits communicates the importance of the
individual SBU segments as planning entities and reinforces the basic hierarchical nature of the planning system.
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many of the firm's managers.

The important point is that in selecting a man-

ager for a particular business, the fit between the style and personality of
the manager, and the strategic mission of the business should be a major consideration.
Another component of management which should be varied across the strategic missions is the reward system.
ple.

The logic involved here is once again sim-

A manager should be rewarded for performance against his assigned stra-

tegic mission as embodied in his strategic plan.

Hence, for example, managers

of cash cows should be rewarded for generating cash and managers of question
marks should be rewarded for gaining competitive position even at the expense
of current profits.

One implication is that a manager of a question mark may

receive a significant bonus for gaining competitive position even though profits were minimal and substantial investment funds were used from other businesses.

One the other hand, a cash cow manager may receive no bonus because,

although his ROI was substantial it fell considerably below the agreed upon
objective in his plans.

The important point is that managerial motivations

need to be aligned with differing strategic missions (aggregated or disaggregated) instead of a uniform corporate directive to increase earnings/ROI each
year.
A final component of management that needs to be differentiated across
strategic missions is capital budgeting.

Resource allocation is one of the

main (if not the main) levers available to corporate management to ensure that
the missions are implemented.

To do this requires that the essence "'of justi-

fying a capital project should revolve around the strategic mission.

For ex-

ample, a capital project for a question mark could have a relatively long payback and low return if the competitive position could be significantly improved.

By contrast a capital project for a dog should require an immediate
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and high return to justify using funds there.

As a further example, a govern-

ment mandated pollution control system should be almost automatically approved
In gener-

for a star, but with a dog abandonment would have to be considered.

al, specific criteria should be developed for approval of projects for each of
the strategic missions and these criteria should be applied at the disaggregated and aggregated levels of anlysis.

In this manner resources can be dis-

tributed in congruence with the differing strategic missions.
The Alternative Approach:

A Review

To summarize the alternative approach to implementing the portfolio concept as -the basis for a planning system, a short review should be useful.
The alternative approach starts with the assumption that in order to obtain a manageable number of SBU's at the corporate level and yet to reflect
the full diversity and complexity of the firm's product/market structure, a
hierarchical application of the analysis is necessary.

At the corporate level

of the hierarchy the authors' research shows that the practical upper limit is
about 50 SBU's.

The actual number will depend on the diversity of the firm,.

the management style of the CEO, and the amount and quality of staff support_
available.

At the SBU level a disaggregated analysis of from 2 to 15 segments

composes the second level of the hierarchy.
ment level may also be useful in some firms.)

(A further breakdown at the segHence, with two levels of hier-

archy in the planning system, a product/market diversity of up to several hundred segments can be reflected.
To help coordinate the inputs between the two levels specific mechanisms
such as those suggested earlier need to be designed into the system.

Further-

more, each level needs to recognize the legitimacy and necessity of the other
level of analysis.

One further comment deserves to be made here.

The SBU
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substantial appeal of this approach is that it promises to recentralize a significant portion of the business strategies.

What CEO has not wished for

additional control over the direction of individual businesses.

Such control

is illusory however.
Instead of centralized control of business strategies, the authors

be~

lieve the portfolio concept offers a general approach to strategy development
throughout the firm that can be matched to the specific circumstances of a
business or managerial level, but still retain a uniformity of approach.
Specifically the portfolio concept is a common set of strategic assumptions
and a common language for dealing with strategy in a diversified firm.

Fur-

thermore, both the language and the assumptions are independent of the individual characteristics of any particular business.
Inherent within the portfolio concept is a common set of assumptions
about strategy.

This includes how the strategic mission of the business is

established (by evaluation against the dimensions of the matrix).

Further-

more, the strategic mission contains certain assumptions about the broad strategic role of a business.
sion.

These assumptions are, in fact, the strategic mis-

For example, a cash cow should generate substantial cash for deployment

elsewhere.

Similar assumptions are contained in any other strategic mission

regardless of the particular matrix used.

Notice that these assumptions are

independent of the detailed characteristics of any particular business.

A

cosmetics business and a home appliance business may have the same generic
strategy even though the detailed nature of these two businesses is substantially different.

Furthermore, the method of establishing or questioning this

common strategic mission is the same (i.e., by evaluation against the dimensions of the matrix) and does not depend on the individual characteristics of
the different businesses.
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The portfolio concept also provides a common language-independent of the
idiosyncrasies of any particular business for talking about strategy.

The

cosmetics business and the home appliance business can be discussed in terms
that are independent of each business.

There are, of course, many features of

the total strategy, as opposed to the strategic mission, that can only be discussed in industry specific terminology.

Still a significant, independent

terminology is contained within the portfolio concept.
The implications of this common set of assumptions about strategy and
common language for communicating about strategy are straightforward and yet
significant.

This set of assumption and language permits the hierarchical de-

termination of strategy discussed earlier while still maintaining a consistent
and interrelated approach.

The de termination of a business' strategy can be

logically split between the aggregated and disaggregated analyses, and yet
consistency of approach and coordination among the two processes can be maintained.

Furthermore strategic communication is facilitated both horizontally

and vertically.
Contrast this to the the situation without the portfolio concept.

Here

the strategies are seen as entirely dependent on detailed knowledge about the
specific businesses.

The standard view of strategy was set forth by Andrews

(1971) in The Concept of Corporate Strategy. Consider the following from this
book:
Deciding what the strategy should be, is at least ideally, a rational undertaking. Its principal subactivities include identifying opportunities and threats in the company's environment and ··attaching some estimate of risk to the discernible alternatives.
Before a choice can be made, the company's strengths and weaknesses must be appraised. Its actual or potential capacity to
take advantage of perceived market needs or to cope with attendent
.risks must be estimated as objectively as possible. The strategic
alternative which results from a matching of opportunity with
corporate capability at an acceptable level of risk is what we may
call an economic strategy.S
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Notice how Andrew's concept of strategy is highly dependent on idiosyncratic
knowledge of a particular business.

Specifically, one must be knowledgeable

of both the environment (threats and opportunities) and the internal strengths
and weaknesses, and this requires in-depth knowledge of the business.

Fur-

thermore, for each business in a diversified firm this knowledge will be
substantially different.

The only generally imposed strategic direction from

the corporate level will be the imperative to "maximize or improve earnings/
ROI" in each business.

There is no generally shared set of assumptions (i.e.,

question marks should rapidly gain competitive position) and no common language for talking about strategy under this approach.

The business strategies

become highly decentralized at the divisional or product/market profit center
level.

It is difficult or impossible for managers not directly involved to

understand and hence question the strategy of a particular business.

Contrast

this to the situation under the portfolio concept, where the same language and
assumptions are used by managers throughout the firm.

Although many compo-

nents of a business strategy must still be developed within the guidelines
suggested by Andrews the language and assumptions of the portfolio concept
still provide the core of the strategy.

It would seem that the portfolio con-

cept can be used in large, diversified firms to facilitate and rationalize
strategy throughout the firm.

However, this can only be achieved by adopting

a flexible, viewpoint instead of the dogmatic approach of an unambiguous corporate level strategy framework.
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Exhibit 3
Aggregation/Disaggregation Example
Competitive Position

Aggregated View:

A

Home Appliance SBU with
A Cash Cow Mission

Competitive Position
Low
4
Disag~regated

View:

four

3

0

0

segments with the cash

High

cow mission dominant but
also with question mark
and dog missions.

note:

1.

home laundry

1

2.

dishwashers

3.

microwave ovens

0

4.

trash compactors

0

diameter of circles proportional to sales.
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EXHIBIT 4
AGGREGATION AND DIVERSIFICATION

Diversification
Category A
Dominant Vertical
Related Constrained
Related Linked

Firm

Rank of
1977 Sales

No. of

JKL
PQR

3

6
14

ABC
GHI

5
6

30

HNO
DEF

2

38

1

43

4

~BU's

24

A. As fully described in Richard P. Rumelt, Strategy, Structure and
Economic Performance, (Cambridge, }fussachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1974). The three categories used here may be summarized as follows:
Dominant Vertical - a vertically integrated finn deriving 70-90% of
annual revenues from "base" business.
Related Constrained - a firm deriving less than 70% of annual revenues from "base" business to each other.
Related Linked - a firm deriving less than 70% of annual revenues
from "base" business where the component businesses although related
are not all related to each other.

EXHIBIT 5
THE AGGREGATION PROBLE~1
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Single
Business
Firms

Aggregation Works
(Related Diversified Firms)

Low
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Firms
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Extent of Diversification

